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The commodity boom between 2002 and 2008 played an important 
role in increasing export earnings from Latin America. Growing demand 
from China for primary products was one factor stimulating the boom. 
While the direct effects of the growth of exports from Latin America 
to China have been extensively explored, the indirect impact of higher 
Chinese demand for commodities on global commodity prices has 
received less attention. This paper estimates the contribution made by 
the growth of Chinese demand to the rise in the prices of the 15 main 
commodities exported from the region. On the basis of these estimates, 
it calculates the total gain for the region as a whole in export revenues 
from the “China effect” on world prices. It also provides estimates for 
17 Latin American countries of the net effect of Chinese-induced price 
increases on their trade balances. 
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The increased economic growth in Latin America since 
the start of the century has been linked to the commodity 
boom and the resulting improvement in the region’s 
terms of trade. A key driver of the substantial increase 
in global commodity prices between 2002 and 2008, 
according to many sources, has been rapid economic 
growth and increased net imports of primary products by 
China or developing Asia more generally (unctad, 2005, 
chapter II; imf, 2006, chapter 5; Streifel, 2006; Park and 
Zhai, 2006; usitc, 2006; Cheung and Morin, 2007). 
Despite the drop in commodity prices since mid-2008, 
the fact that China has continued to grow rapidly indicates 
that it continues to help to maintain commodity prices 
at higher levels than would otherwise be the case.
Although previous studies have established that the 
growth of demand from China has been an important 
factor in recent primary commodity price dynamics, 
few have sought to estimate the extent to which China 
has increased the prices of particular commodities, 
focusing rather on the contribution of China to the 
growth of global demand, or the increased correlation 
between commodity prices and Chinese economic 
activity. The one exception is a study by the United States 
International Trade Commission (usitc, 2006) which 
provides estimates of the impact of China on the prices 
of oil and aluminium. However, this study is restricted 
to a small number of commodities.
Looked at from the Latin American side, several 
studies have noted the way in which output movements 
in China and Latin America have become more closely 
synchronized in recent years (Lehmann and others, 
2007; Cesa-Bianchi and others, 2009; Calderón, 2009). 
It has been found that the major factor in explaining this 
increased synchronization has been “demand spillovers”, 
operating particularly through the impact of China on 
global commodity prices, rather than increased bilateral 
trade between Latin America and China (Calderón, 
2009). Further exploration of the impact of China on 
world commodity prices is therefore an important step 
in understanding the implications of the re-emergence 
of China as an economic power for the region.
The aim of the present paper is to provide an 
estimate of the extent to which Latin American export 
earnings have increased as a result of the impact of 
China’s economic boom on global commodity prices. 
In the next section, the major commodities exported 
from Latin America are identified and the growth of 
Chinese demand for these commodities and the rise in 
international prices documented. Section III explains 
the partial equilibrium approach used to calculate the 
contribution of China to the increase in prices and the 
data used. Section IV provides empirical estimates of 
the impact of demand from China on the prices of the 
selected commodities between 2002 and 2007. Section 
V then estimates the total gain in export earnings for 
Latin America as a result of the increased commodity 
prices attributable to the rapid growth of demand from 
China. Section VI takes the analysis further by looking 
at the impacts on individual countries within the region. 
A concluding section summarizes the findings and 
compares them to the impact of direct trade between 




Latin American commodity exports  
and the “China effect”
Despite active promotion of industrial development by 
Latin American governments in the second half of the 
twentieth century, the region as a whole remains heavily 
dependent on exports of primary commodities, which 
accounted for just over half of total export earnings in 
2007, according to the United Nations Commodity Trade 
Database (comtrade). If Mexico is excluded, the share 
of primary commodities is even more significant, rising 
to over two thirds of the total. Unsurprisingly, Latin 
American economic performance is closely associated 
with movements in commodity prices (Lehmann, Moreno 
and Jaramillo, 2007).
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For the purposes of this study, the top 15 primary 
commodities1 exported from Latin America in 2007 
were identified. These commodities can be grouped into 
six broad product groups with distinct characteristics 
(see table 1).
Total exports of these 15 products from Latin America 
came to around US$ 260 billion in 2007, accounting for 
two thirds of the region’s exports of primary products 
and around a third of total export earnings.
TABLE 1




Minerals, ores and metals Copper; iron ore; 
aluminium; zinc
Feedstuffs Soybeans; soybean oil; 
fishmeal
Tropical food and beverages Coffee; sugar; bananas
Meat products Beef; poultry
Forest products Timber; wood pulp
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of Standard International 
Trade Classification (sitc) Rev. 2.
China has become an increasingly important player 
in the world market for a number of the commodities 
which Latin America exports (eclac, 2008, chapter I.8; 
Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2009; Rosales and Kuwayama, 
2007, p. 85). It is now the world’s leading consumer of 
many commodities and accounts for a substantial share 
of world demand. 
Table 2 shows, in common with other studies (e.g., 
Streifel, 2006; imf, 2006, chapter 5), that the “China 
effect” on global demand has been most marked in the 
case of minerals, ores and metals. China has reached a 
level of income at which metal use relative to gdp tends 
to rise significantly (unctad, 2005, figure 2.2). This has 
been a result of the rapid industrialization process in 
China, which has become increasingly metal-intensive 
over time as production has shifted from labour-intensive 
goods (such as clothing) to more capital-intensive sectors 
(such as electrical and electronics) (Cheung and Morin, 
2007). Demand for metals has also been driven by 
construction and other infrastructure projects (World 
Bank, 2009, box 2.5).
1  Primary commodities were defined as Standard International Trade 
Classification (sitc) Rev. 2 classes 0-4 and 68.
TABLE 2
China’s share of global consumption  
of primary commodities, 2002 and 2007
(Percentages)






 Oil 6.9 9.3 185.1
Minerals, ores and metals
 Iron ore 22.3 43.9 184.7
 Copper 18.2 27.1 356.5
 Aluminium 21.1 33.2 95.4
 Zinc 22.4 32.4 316.4
Feedstuffs
 Soybean 18.4 20.9 80.6
 Soybean oil 21.2 25.9 85.1
 Fishmeal 23.0 27.5 83.6
Tropical food and beverages
 Coffee 0.3 0.4 125.6
 Sugar 7.9 9.3 46.4
 Bananas 8.8 9.4 28.6
Meat products
 Beef 10.6 12.3 22.6
 Poultry 16.8 17.2 23.9
Forest products
 Sawn wood 4.0 8.6 63.6
 Chemical pulp 5.7 7.8 55.5
Source: China’s share of consumption calculated by the author on 
the basis of sources cited in the text, price data taken from United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (unctad) (2008), 
Trade and Development Report 2008, Geneva, table 2.1, United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.08.II.D.21, and International 
Monetary Fund (imf), World Economic Outlook Database.
Not surprisingly, the contribution to demand has 
been most striking in the case of iron ore, where China 
accounts for over 40% of world consumption. Thus, a 
significant initial share of world consumption in 2002 
and a large increase in share between 2002 and 2007 
combined to make China a major driver of world demand 
for iron ore in this period. The demand has been driven 
by the growth of the Chinese iron and steel industry, 
with China increasing its share of global steel production 
from a fifth in 2002 to a third by 2007 and moving from 
being a net steel importer to a net exporter (iisi, 2008 
and 2004). Although not as striking as the case of iron 
ore, the growth of Chinese consumption of other metals 
(copper, aluminium and zinc) has also made an important 
contribution to global demand. 
China’s energy use grew more slowly than gdp 
during the 1980s and 1990s, following the economic 
reforms of the late 1970s. Since 2000, however, the 
energy intensity of gdp has begun to rise again (Cheung 
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and Morin, 2007, p. 4). Moreover, the share of coal, 
which accounts for the bulk of energy use, has been 
falling, while that of other sources of energy such as oil, 
natural gas and hydroelectric power has risen (unctad, 
2005, pp. 49-50). This has been reflected in China’s 
increased share of world demand for crude oil since 
2002 (see table 2). 
After minerals and metals, the next most significant 
product group in terms of China’s share of global 
consumption is feedstuffs. This reflects the rapid 
growth of demand for animal feed (including fish food 
for aquaculture) in China as living standards rise and 
consumption patterns change. By the end of the 1990s, 
China’s level of daily calorie intake per capita was 
already relatively high and, particularly in urban areas, 
consumers were shifting towards meat, fish, vegetable 
oils and fruit (unctad, 2005, p. 45). China is now a 
leading market for soybeans and fishmeal and its share 
of world consumption has increased over time. 
In this context, it is perhaps surprising that the 
growth in China’s share of world consumption of meat 
products in table 1 is not more significant. In the case of 
poultry, growth in demand in China between 2002 and 
2007 was depressed by the impact of the 2004 avian flu 
outbreak.2 In the case of beef, per capita consumption in 
China is around a tenth of the level in the United States 
and a quarter of the average level in the 27 countries of 
the European Union (Foreign Agricultural Service of 
the United States Department of Agriculture, Office of 
Global Analysis), so that although China’s share of global 
demand is rising, it remains relatively limited.
In the case of forest products, China’s growing 
share of world chemical pulp consumption has been 
driven by the growth of capacity in the domestic paper 
and packaging industry. Local consumption of paper 
more than doubled between 1995 and 2004 (usitc, 2006, 
table 4-3). A significant driver of this growth was the 
demand for packaging from the manufacturing sector. 
However, part of the increased demand has been met by 
production using waste paper, which has grown faster 
in recent years than the use of pulp (usitc, 2006, tables 
4-1 and 4-2). As a result, China’s share of global demand 
for pulp is less than might be expected. 
China’s global consumption share has increased 
more for sawn wood than for pulp since 2002 (see 
table 2). The pervasiveness of illegal logging, which has 
been widely commented upon, may have led to Chinese 
2  Per capita consumption of poultry fell in China in 2004 and only 
recovered slowly after that (Foreign Agricultural Service of the United 
States Department of Agriculture, Office of Global Analysis).
imports being underestimated in official statistics, so that 
the country’s impact on global demand may be greater 
than the reported figures suggest (dfid, 2005).
China is not yet an important consumer in the 
world market for tropical agricultural products. Coffee 
consumption is still extremely limited in China, and 
while consumption of bananas and sugar is much 
more widespread, these are almost entirely produced 
domestically so that it is unlikely that the growth of 
Chinese consumption would have had a significant 
impact on the world market for either product.
Table 2 also shows the substantial price increases 
that occurred for most primary commodities between 
2002 and 2007. The most dramatic rises were in metals, 
particularly copper and zinc, and in oil. Feedstuffs have 
also increased significantly in price, although this is largely 
attributable to dramatic increases in 2007 associated with 
the demand for land to grow biofuels (World Bank, 2009, 
pp. 61-63). Other agricultural products have generally 
had more modest price increases.
Although the Chinese economy has been growing 
rapidly for three decades, there are several reasons 
why China only began to have a significant impact on 
global commodity prices at the start of the twenty-first 
century. During the 1980s and 1990s, the energy and 
metal intensity of China’s gdp fell, but this situation was 
reversed from the late 1990s or early 2000s (Cheung and 
Morin, 2007; unctad, 2005, pp. 47-49). Increases in 
industrial efficiency as a result of the economic reforms 
of the late 1970s led to a fall in energy and metal use at 
the plant level. At the same time, this was reinforced by 
changes in the composition of industry as a result of the 
shift away from the emphasis on heavy industry during 
the period of central planning towards light industries 
during the early phase of China’s transition to an export-
oriented market economy. More recently, however, as 
noted above, there has been a shift to capital-intensive 
and energy-intensive industries, including road building 
and construction. This has led to an increase in the metal 
and energy elasticity of Chinese gdp growth since the 
turn of the millennium.
China has also become much more integrated with 
global commodity markets over the past decade as the 
growth of demand for a number of commodities has 
outstripped domestic supply.3 This has been reflected 
in significant increases in net imports of commodities 
such as copper, iron ore, nickel, crude oil and soybeans 
3  For example, whereas domestic production of iron ore covered 
85% of domestic consumption in 1990, this had fallen to 45% by 
2003 (unctad, 2005, p. 74).
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(unctad, 2005, figure 2.8). Where China has remained 
largely self-sufficient in terms of supply, on the other 
hand, its impact on global commodity prices is likely 
to have been minimal. 
Finally, the impact of China on global commodity 
prices depends not only on the growth rate of Chinese 
demand but also on its initial share of global consumption, 
and it was only at the beginning of the twenty-first century 
that China became a sufficiently important consumer 
to affect the prices of a number of key commodities. 
Calderón (2009, p. 54), for instance, suggests that 
“2002-2003 may represent the turning point in the 
relationship between Chinese industrial production and 
world commodity prices”.
Although the focus of this study is the impact of 
the growth of Chinese demand on commodity prices, it 
is important to bear in mind that this is by no means the 
only factor that has affected prices in recent years. On 
the demand side, other markets for primary commodities 
have also grown and the contribution of China to global 
demand growth differs considerably between commodities. 
Demand may also be affected by movements in the prices 
of close substitutes.
Supply-side factors also have a significant impact 
on prices, particularly but by no means exclusively in the 
case of agricultural products whose supply is affected 
by climatic factors. All commodities may be affected 
by changes in the costs of inputs which shift the supply 
curve, and oil and minerals are affected by new resource 
discoveries. The supply of oil and minerals may also be 
disrupted by political conflict or labour unrest in major 
producing countries.
In addition to the forces of supply and demand 
in the real economy, commodity prices are also 
affected by financial factors. Since commodity prices 
are normally measured in United States dollar terms, 
changes in the value of the dollar affect the quoted 
price. The dollar was at a peak in 2002 and had fallen 
by around 25% by the end of 2007 (imf, 2008, box 
1.4). Commodity prices (excluding oil) rose by 113% 
in dollar terms between 2002 and 2007 but by only 80% 
when measured in terms of Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs) (unctad, 2008, table 2.1). The International 
Monetary Fun (imf) estimates that the oil price would 
have been US$ 25 a barrel lower at the end of 2007 
(i.e., over 25% lower than it actually was at the time), 
and non-fuel commodity prices 12% lower, if the dollar 
had maintained its 2002 value.
The impact of speculation on commodity prices has 
been a matter of controversy. There is general agreement 
that there has been an increase in the significance of 
financial investment in many commodity markets in 
recent years (World Bank, 2009, chapter 2; unctad, 
2009, chapter 2). A study of five commodities (crude oil, 
copper, sugar, coffee and cotton) by imf concluded that 
there was little evidence that speculation affected either 
long-run price levels or short-run volatility, although this 
conclusion was subject to a number of caveats (imf, 2006, 
box 5.1). In contrast, unctad (2008, box 2.1 and 2009, 
chapter 2) argues that the growth of speculation probably 
accelerated and amplified price fluctuations.
No attempt will be made here to estimate the impact 
of these other factors on commodity prices in recent 
years. Rather, the challenge is to try and separate out 
the impact of the growth in demand from China. The 
approach adopted is a partial equilibrium one which 
only seeks to identify the first round effects of Chinese 
demand on global prices.
III
Methodology and data
The first step in the analysis is to identify the contribution 
of China’s growth to global demand for the primary 
commodities exported from Latin America. The period 
covered is from the start of the recent commodity boom 
in 2002 to 2007. The volatility of prices with the collapse 
of the boom in 2008 and the fact that trade data were not 
available for all the Latin American countries for 2008 
were the key reasons why the analysis was not extended 
beyond 2007. Global and Chinese demand for the 15 
commodities identified in table 3 (in physical terms) 
were obtained from various sources. 
There are several possible counterfactuals which 
could be used to estimate the “China effect” on global 
demand. One possibility would simply be to compare 
actual global demand for each commodity in 2007 with 
demand excluding China. This would be the equivalent 
of a counterfactual in which “China does not exist”. 
A second approach would be simply to calculate the 
78
ThE “ChInA EFFECT” on CommodITy PRICEs And LATIn AmERICAn ExPoRT EARnIngs  •  Rhys JEnkIns
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 3  •  A P R I L  2 0 1 1
increase in Chinese consumption of each commodity 
between 2002 and 2007, and subtract this from global 
demand. This implies a counterfactual in which 
Chinese consumption remains unchanged or “China 
does not grow”. However, since we are interested 
in the impact of the exceptional growth of Chinese 
demand on commodity prices, a more appropriate 
counterfactual is one where Chinese demand grows at 
the same rate as demand in the rest of the world. Thus, 
a hypothetical global demand for the 15 commodities 
in 2007 is estimated on the assumption that China’s 
demand growth between 2002 and 2007 was the same 
as the rest of the world’s.4 The difference between this 
figure and actual demand in 2007 provides an estimate 
of the extent to which China’s exceptional economic 
performance increased world demand for the products 
concerned over the period since 2002. This is the 
approach adopted in the paper.
One limitation of this approach is that it assumes 
that the growth of demand in China and in the rest of the 
world are independent of each other. A first objection 
to this is that, to the extent that rapid growth in China 
boosts demand in the rest of the world, a slower rate 
of growth in China would also lead to a reduction in 
growth elsewhere. The question then is: how significant 
is Chinese demand for growth in the rest of the world?5 
China’s relatively small share of global demand, averaging 
4.6% between 2003 and 2007 (Timmer, 2010, table 1), 
suggests that its impact on demand in the rest of the 
world was quite limited during the period.
A second objection, relevant at the level of individual 
commodities, is that the growth in demand in China may 
partly be the result of the relocation of certain industries 
from other countries, rather than a result of increased 
global demand for commodities. For example, if the rapid 
growth in demand for iron ore in China is partly a result 
of the relocation of the global steel industry to China, this 
may have been at the expense of demand for iron ore in 
other countries. Thus, the estimated additional growth in 
demand from China may not represent additional world 
demand for iron ore, and the implicit assumption that the 
growth of demand in China and in the rest of the world 
are independent of each other is not strictly valid.
While the first objection suggests that ignoring the 
“China effect” on the rest of the world tends to result in 
4  This counterfactual could be termed the “China’s share does not 
increase” scenario.
5  This question is key to an ongoing debate about the extent to which 
China can become the engine for world economic recovery. For 
contrasting views, see Dollar (2009) and Timmer (2010).
underestimation of its total impact on global demand 
for commodities, the second suggests the opposite. 
Although there is no reason to suppose that these two 
effects necessarily balance each other out, the fact 
that they operate in opposite directions, and that these 
indirect effects may be small relative to the direct effects, 
provides a partial justification for not taking them into 
account here.
The counterfactual used to calculate the impact of 
China’s exceptional growth on commodity prices assumes 
that the other factors affecting prices discussed earlier, 
such as shifts in supply curves, exchange-rate alterations 
and speculation, remain unchanged. In other words, we 
are interested in how much lower commodity prices 
would have been in 2007 had China’s share of world 
demand remained at the same level as in 2002, ceteris 
paribus. Since in effect this means a counterfactual in 
which the demand curve has shifted downwards, the 
effect on prices will depend on the elasticity of global 
supply for each commodity.
Estimates of the global elasticity of supply for 
the commodities concerned are surprisingly difficult 
to come by, and when they are available there is often 
a considerable range of estimates. In the light of this, 
it was decided that it would be more useful to take a 
range rather than a single value for the elasticities used to 
calculate the impact on global prices. These elasticities 
were then applied to the estimated contribution of China’s 
rapid growth to global demand for each commodity in 
order to arrive at the impact on world prices.
Finally, the gains to Latin America from the China 
effect on global demand were calculated by estimating 
how much lower in dollar terms Latin America’s exports 
of each of these commodities would have been in 2007 
in the absence of the China-induced price rise. This 
involved deflating the 2007 value of exports from the 
region by the price rise attributable to the excess growth 
of demand from China between 2002 and 2007. At the 
level of the region as a whole, this was done using gross 
exports in order to obtain an estimate of the additional 
export earnings accruing to Latin America as a result 
of the “China effect” (see table 5 below). However, 
since different countries within the region may be 
affected differently depending on whether they are net 
exporters or net importers of these commodities, the 
estimates at the individual country level are based on 
net exports and therefore reflect the influence of price 
changes on trade balances (table 6). The latter can of 
course be negative where a country is a net importer of 
a commodity which has increased significantly in price 
as a result of Chinese demand.
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The data on the volume of consumption of the 
various commodities globally and in China were 
obtained from a variety of sources. Oil consumption 
came from the bp publication bp Statistical Review 
of World Energy, 2008. Consumption of iron ore was 
from the International Iron and Steel Institute, World 
Steel in Figures (various issues), and other minerals 
were from the World Bureau of Metal Statistics, World 
Metals Statistics. The source for meat products, grains, 
meals and oil, and sugar was the Foreign Agricultural 
Service of the United States Department of Agriculture, 
while figures for forest products, coffee and bananas 
were based on United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (fao) data.
The elasticity estimates used in the study were 
based on a search of a large number of sources which 
are listed in the appendix. Since the period analysed 
is only five years and the increase in prices was most 
marked in the later years, use was made of short- or 
medium-run supply elasticities, which tend to be lower 
than their long-run counterparts. Studies from earlier 
periods were not necessarily always a good guide to 
the elasticity of supply in the early twenty-first century, 
so that an element of judgement had to be applied in 
determining a plausible range of elasticity estimates, 
based on recent studies of supply conditions for the 
commodities concerned.
In order to estimate the “China effect” on the export 
earnings and trade balances of the Latin American 
economies, data on exports and imports of each of the 
15 commodities in 2007 were obtained for 17 countries 
from the United Nations Commodity Trade Database. In 
the case of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, data 
for exports in 2007 were unavailable and were therefore 
estimated as the average of the values reported for each 
commodity in 2006 and 2008.
IV
The “China effect” on commodity prices
1. China’s contribution to increasing global 
demand
As indicated above, the first step in estimating the “China 
effect” on global commodity prices is to calculate the 
addition to global demand resulting from China’s rapid 
economic growth. In other words, the question being 
addressed is: how much greater is world demand for a 
commodity than it would have been if demand in China 
had grown at the same rate as in the rest of the world 
between 2002 and 2007?
The first two columns of table 3 compare the 
increase in consumption in China with that in the rest 
of the world for the key commodities between 2002 and 
2007. In all cases other than poultry, demand grew much 
faster in China than in the rest of the world, and this 
was reflected in the increase in China’s share of global 
consumption of these products, as shown in table 2. 
The third column of table 3 measures how much higher 
actual world consumption of these commodities is than 
it would have been had demand in China grown at the 
same rate as demand in the rest of the world. In other 
words, it measures the impact of China’s high growth, 
relative to the rest of the world, on global demand.
Not surprisingly, table 3 shows that the “China 
effect” in terms of additional demand has been most 
marked in minerals, ores and metals, particularly iron 
ore. The next most significant group in terms of impact 
has been feedstuffs. The impact in terms of additional 
demand for oil and forest products has been relatively 
limited, while tropical food and beverages and meat 
products are the categories in which Chinese demand 
growth in the period had least effect.
2. The “China effect” on world prices
The impact of Chinese demand growth on the world 
price of different commodities depends not only on 
the size of the demand effect. It is also affected by the 
responsiveness of global supply to increased demand 
and the extent to which an integrated global market 
exists and China is part of it.
The second and third columns of table 4 present the 
estimates for the upper and lower bounds of the range 
of supply elasticities used for the various commodities. 
Since these relate to the short or medium term, they are 
all relatively low, reflecting the difficulty of increasing 
supply in the short term, particularly in the case of 
crude oil and some minerals. The supply elasticities 
of tree crops with long gestation periods (e.g., coffee 
and timber) are also relatively low, while livestock and 
grains tend to have a more elastic supply.
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TABLE 3




China Rest of world
Fuels
 Oil 48.7 6.6 2.7
Minerals, ores and metals
 Iron ore 224.9 19.5 38.4
 Copper 77.6 6.1 12.3
 Aluminium 124.3 20.4 18.2
 Zinc 70.7 2.9 14.8
Feedstuffs
 Soybean 37.2 17.7 3.1
 Soybean oil 54.2 18.4 6.4
 Fishmeal 24.8 -1.9 6.3
Tropical food and beverages
 Coffee 32.3 -1.9 0.1
 Sugar 30.6 9.2 1.5
 Bananas 25.0 17.0 0.6
Meat products
 Beef 27.1 7.2 2.0
 Poultry 21.6 18.7 0.4
Forest products
 Sawn wood 131.8 2.8 5.0
 Chemical pulp 45.0 3.3 2.3
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of the source indicated in table 2.
a This measures how much higher global demand for the commodity was in 2007 than it would have been had demand in China increased 
at the same rate as in the rest of the world between 2002 and 2007.
TABLE 4
Estimated impact of Chinese demand on world prices, 2007
Effect of Chinese demand 
(percentages)
Price elasticity of supply “China effect”  (percentages)a
Lower Upper Maximum Minimum
Crude oil 2.7 0.1 0.25 27.1 10.8
Iron ore 38.4 0.25 0.4 153.6 96.0
Copper 12.3 0.1 0.25 122.6 49.1
Aluminium 18.2 0.25 0.4 72.8 45.5
Zinc 14.8 0.1 0.25 147.6 59.1
Soybean 3.1 0.4 0.6 7.7 5.1
Soybean oil 6.4 0.4 0.6 16.0 10.7
Fishmeal 6.3 0.4 0.6 15.6 10.4
Coffee 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.2
Sugar 1.5 0.1 0.5 15.5 3.1
Bananas 0.6 0.2 0.4 3.0 1.5
Beef 2.0 0.3 0.6 6.6 3.3
Poultry 0.4 0.3 0.6 1.4 0.7
Sawn wood 5.0 0.2 0.6 25.1 8.4
Chemical pulp 2.3 0.2 0.6 11.5 3.8
Source: prepared by the author from table 3 and sources of elasticity estimates cited in the appendix.
a This measures how much higher the world price for the commodity was in 2007 than it would have been had demand in China increased 
at the same rate as in the rest of the world between 2002 and 2007.
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In metals, the elasticity of supply in the short run 
depends on the capacity available to increase output and 
the level of stocks. In the case of copper, low prices in 
the 1990s meant that there was very little investment in 
new capacity so that when demand increased after 2002, 
supply did not respond and stocks fell sharply from 1.7 
million metric tons at the end of 2002 to 0.7 million 
in 2006 (cochilco, 2008). The low estimated supply 
elasticity reflects this. A similar situation is apparent in 
the case of zinc, where demand has outstripped supply 
in recent years and stocks fell by half between 2003 
and 2006 (International Lead and Zinc Study Group). 
Most zinc comes from underground operations, and it 
is difficult to increase production from existing mines 
because of the high capital cost of expansion (Dr. Harlyn 
Meade quoted in Williams, 2007).
Higher supply elasticities were assumed for iron 
ore and aluminium. In the case of iron ore, the supply 
situation appears more favourable than for copper or 
zinc, with substantial increases in capacity in recent years 
(Ostensson, 2005). In contrast to other minerals, prices 
for iron ore are set by negotiation between the main 
producers and the importers rather than on commodity 
exchanges, so that it is unlikely that speculation could 
have affected prices. Finally, capacity expansion in 
aluminium, particularly in China, has meant that a margin 
of capacity has been maintained and stocks did not fall 
significantly between 2002 and 2006 (usgs, Mineral 
Commodity Summaries: Aluminum).
Supply problems have also been particularly apparent 
in the case of oil, where high prices have not led to 
increases in capacity, leading to a drop in the effective 
spare capacity of the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (opec) after 2002 (imf, 2008, figure 
1.18). The sluggish response of supply in the industry 
has been attributed to a longer lag between increased 
prices and new investment being made than in the past. 
This in turn partly reflects geological and technological 
factors such as the declining average size of oil fields 
and the challenges of exploiting non-conventional 
sources such as deep sea fields or oil sands (imf, 2008, 
box 1.5). As with copper, this suggests a low estimate 
for the elasticity of supply.
Agricultural products tend to have a shorter gestation 
period and therefore a higher short-run elasticity of 
supply than oil and minerals. The exceptions are tree 
crops such as coffee and forest products, which take 
a number of years to mature. Annual crops such as 
soybeans respond relatively quickly to price increases, 
as land can be switched from other crops. The soybean 
acreage in Argentina and Brazil, for example, has doubled 
since the mid-1990s in response to the growth in world 
demand (Ray, 2008).
The fourth and fifth columns of table 4 calculate 
the impact of the growth of Chinese demand on world 
prices, given the supply elasticities in the second and 
third columns. The fourth column provides the upper 
end of the range based on the low elasticities of supply 
in the second column, while the fifth column provides 
the minimum likely impact on prices, based on the higher 
elasticities in the third column.
The most significant impacts are found for the four 
metals included. These are of course the commodities 
for which prices have risen most during the period under 
consideration, with zinc and copper increasing more 
than fourfold, iron ore almost threefold and aluminium 
almost twofold in price since 2002 (see table 2). 
The growth of Chinese demand for iron ore above 
the rate of consumption growth in the rest of the world 
is estimated to have doubled the world price, although as 
noted above this is an overestimate to the extent that growth 
in China has led to a reduction in demand elsewhere. In 
the case of both copper and zinc, the “China effect” on 
global price levels was significant because the supply 
was inelastic, while the estimated effect on the price of 
aluminium was slightly lower because supply appears 
to have been more elastic. In all these cases, prices are 
estimated to have increased by at least 40% as a result 
of the growth in demand from China.
The “China effect” is estimated to have been in the 
range of 10% to 25% on the prices of four commodities. 
In the case of crude oil, despite China’s relatively small 
share of total world demand, the fact that this share rose 
over the period plus the low elasticity of supply meant 
that prices were significantly affected by China’s growth. 
Since the overall increase in oil prices during this period 
was more than 180%, however, other factors were clearly 
far more important than China in driving up prices.6 The 
other three products are soybean oil, fishmeal and sawn 
wood. In the case of the first two, this reflects the high 
share of China in world consumption of these products, 
while in the case of wood it is the rapid increase in its 
share over the period that is most striking. 
In the case of all the other commodities covered, 
the estimated effect of Chinese demand on prices over 
the period was less than 10%. The growth in demand for 
soybeans from China has largely been met by increases 
6  The United States International Trade Commission came to a similar 
conclusion for the 1995-2004 period, when it estimates that of an oil 
price increase of 200%, the growth of Chinese demand was responsible 
for between 12% and 37% (usitc, 2006, p. A.6).
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in the area harvested in recent years, particularly in 
Argentina and Brazil, and it is only since 2007, with 
the increased competition for land (especially in the 
United States) to produce biofuels, that soybean prices 
have risen sharply (Ray, 2008). 
The impact of Chinese demand on prices for tropical 
food and beverages is likely to have been very small. 
Table 4 makes this very clear in the case of coffee, where 
the estimated price increase attributable to China is 
negligible, and of bananas, where it is relatively small. 
The estimate for sugar is much higher, but given the 
fact that China is not a significant importer and that the 
global market for sugar is highly fragmented as a result 
of preferential agreements, it is unlikely that in practice 
China would have had any real impact on world prices 
for sugar products.
Meat product prices have also been relatively 
unaffected by Chinese demand. As noted above, poultry 
consumption in China was affected by the avian flu 
epidemic. Despite the growth in demand for beef in 
China, this has had a relatively minor effect on pricing. 
This is the product group for which world prices have 
increased least in the period since 2002 (see table 2).
In the case of forest products, Chinese demand has 
had a moderate impact on the price of chemical pulp 
and a much more significant effect on prices for sawn 
wood, as noted above. In the latter case, the effect may 
even be underestimated to the extent that the “China 
effect” is hidden by the scale of the illegal trade in 
timber that went unrecorded in the estimates of Chinese 
timber consumption. On the other hand, transport costs 
mean that the market for sawn wood tends to be quite 
regionalized and the main sources of imports to China 
are the Russian Federation and South-East Asia. Thus, 
any price impacts of growing Chinese demand are less 
likely to have affected the Latin American countries.
V
The “China effect” on Latin American  
export earnings
The final calculation that needs to be made is the extent 
to which Latin American export earnings have increased 
as a result of the rise in prices of primary products 
attributable to the rapid growth in demand from China. 
Table 5 provides estimates for each of the 15 commodities. 
The first column presents the value of exports in 2007. 
The second and third columns provide high and low 
estimates for the “China effect” through higher world 
prices on the value of Latin American exports of these 
commodities. The fourth column gives a best estimate 
which in most cases is simply the mid-point of the range 
indicated by the second and third columns. In the case 
of sugar and bananas, the best estimate reflects the fact 
that the most plausible assumption is that China has not 
affected the price of Latin American exports.
Table 5 shows that two commodities, oil and copper, 
account for roughly three quarters of the total gain in 
export revenues resulting from the “China effect” on 
commodity prices. The two contribute in roughly equal 
measure, despite the fact that total exports of oil from 
Latin America are much larger than those of copper. This 
reflects the greater impact that demand from China has 
had on copper prices compared to oil, as noted earlier. The 
third most important product is iron ore, accounting for 
a further 10% or so of the total gain in foreign-exchange 
earnings, followed by aluminium and zinc.
Following behind these in terms of their contribution 
are soybeans and soybean oil, but these are relatively 
limited in terms of the additional export earnings created, 
which totalled between US$ 1.2 billion and US$ 1.7 billion 
in 2007. The next most significant group of exports after 
feedstuffs is forest products, with estimates of the total 
impact ranging from US$ 450 million to US$ 1.2 billion, 
divided roughly equally between wood and pulp.
The impact on meat exports has been relatively 
small, with most of the gain being attributed to beef, 
while there has been virtually no additional revenue 
from poultry. Finally, as indicated above, China has 
had little impact on world prices of tropical fruits and 
beverages, so that it seems reasonable to disregard the 
estimated effects on bananas and sugar in order to arrive 
at a more realistic total.
The estimated total effect of Chinese demand on Latin 
American export earnings from all 15 commodities was 
between US$ 41 billion and US$ 73 billion, with a best 
estimate of over US$ 56 billion. This latter figure represents 
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21% of the value of exports of all 15 commodities and 
7% of total Latin American exports in 2007. 
A number of warnings need to be attached to 
these estimates. First, they should be taken as orders of 
magnitude rather than precise values, since the elasticity 
estimates taken from a variety of sources may not be 
accurate. A doubling of the assumed elasticity for each 
commodity would halve the estimated effect. Since the 
elasticities used for the main commodities that contribute 
to the overall impact (oil and metals) are low, they are 
likely if anything to have caused the impact of China on 
Latin American export earnings to be overestimated.
A second factor that might lead to overestimation 
of the “China effect” on prices and export earnings is 
the possibility that the growth of Chinese demand is not 
entirely a net addition to global demand. It may be that 
some of the growth has been offset by a fall in demand 
in other markets because the industries which use the 
commodities as inputs have relocated to China. This is 
most likely to be the case for metals, which are a major 
contributor to the estimated additional earnings.
A third consideration is that the estimates presented 
here have been based on the total value of the region’s 
exports of the 15 commodities in order to calculate the 
gain in export earnings. However, some countries in the 
region import some of these commodities, and it might 
therefore be more appropriate to look at net exports 
rather than the total value. If this were done, then the 
estimated gain to the region as a result of the “China 
effect” on commodity prices would be about 16% lower 
(between US$ 34 billion and US$ 61 billion, rather than 
between US$ 41 billion and US$ 73 billion).
TABLE 5
China: estimated impact on Latin American export earnings  
for 15 commodities, 2007
(Millions of dollars)
Exports Estimated effect of China on value of exports
2007 Maximum Minimum Best
Crude oil 129 294 27 580 12 651 20 116
Iron ore 11 585 7 016 5 674 6 345
Copper 50 494 27 815 16 618 22 217
Aluminium 6 587 2 775 2 060 2 418
Zinc 4 789 2 856 1 779 2 317
Soybean 11 237 799 546 672
Soybean oil 6 509 898 627 763
Fishmeal 1 970 266 186 226
Coffee 8 584 43 17 30
Sugar 6 251 838 188 0
Bananas 3 273 95 48 0
Beef 6 596 407 210 308
Poultry 4 708 65 33 49
Sawn wood 3 279 657 253 455
Chemical pulp 5 422 558 200 379
Total 260 579 72 670 41 090 56 295
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of the United Nations Commodity Trade Database (comtrade).
84
ThE “ChInA EFFECT” on CommodITy PRICEs And LATIn AmERICAn ExPoRT EARnIngs  •  Rhys JEnkIns
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 3  •  A P R I L  2 0 1 1
The analysis of the previous section focuses on the 
aggregate effects of the rapid growth of Chinese 
commodity demand for Latin America as a whole. It 
is clear from what has been said about the differential 
impact of China on different commodities, however, 
that the effects are unlikely to be uniform across the 
countries of the region. Specifically, while the impact 
will have been positive for those countries which are net 
exporters of these commodities, particularly minerals 
and oil, some countries which are net importers may 
well have lost out from the higher commodity prices 
resulting from rapid Chinese growth. This section 
extends the analysis to the level of the individual Latin 
American countries.
The impact on foreign-exchange earnings was 
estimated by applying the price changes calculated in table 
4 to net exports of the 15 commodities in each country. 
Thus, where a country is a net importer of a commodity 
whose price has risen as a result of the “China effect”, 
this will be shown as a loss of foreign exchange, while 
for commodities where it is a net exporter, there will be 
a foreign-exchange gain.
Table 6 summarizes the results for 17 Latin American 
countries in 2007. It shows the percentage by which 
each country’s trade balance in the 15 commodities is 
better (worse) than it would have been if China’s share 
in world demand for these commodities had remained 
unchanged since 2002. As previously, two estimates are 
presented, based on lower- and upper-bound values for 
the price elasticities of each commodity.
The selected countries fall into four broad groups. 
First, there are those which are substantial beneficiaries 
of higher commodity prices, with estimated gains of 
between 20% and 50% as a result of the “China effect”. 
These are the mineral-exporting economies of the region, 
Peru, Chile and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. The 
next group, with gains of between 7% and 20%, is made 
up of three significant oil exporters (the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Mexico and Ecuador) and the 
two most diversified economies of the region (Brazil and 
Argentina). Four other countries have gained slightly 
on balance from the “China effect”, with increases in 
foreign-exchange earnings of less than 10%. These 
include two Central American countries, where the 
gains are minimal, and Colombia and Paraguay. Finally, 
there are five countries where the net impact of Chinese 
demand on commodity prices has been negative. These 
are four Central American economies (El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama) and Uruguay. In 
all these cases, the gains from higher export prices for 
these commodities are more than offset by the increased 
cost of imports.
Previous analyses of the “China effect” on Latin 
America have noted the different effects on South America 
on the one hand and Mexico (and in some cases Central 
America) on the other (Devlin and others, 2006, chapter 
2; Ellis, 2009, chapter 2; González, 2008). Whereas a 
number of South American countries, most notably 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, have developed 
significant exports to China and are seen therefore as 
VI
winners and losers in the commodity lottery
TABLE 6
China: estimated impact on the net export 













Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 21.4 10.1
Subtotal for Mexico and South America 23.8 13.3
Costa Rica -13.3 -7.5





Subtotal for Central America -6.0 -4.0
Total for Latin America 23.3 13.0
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of the United Nations 
Commodity Trade Database (comtrade).
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major beneficiaries of Chinese growth, Mexico is seen 
as having been disadvantaged because of the increased 
competition that it has faced from Chinese manufactured 
goods in the United States market. This is also reflected 
in the bilateral trade balances between China and the 
different Latin American countries, with Mexico and 
Central America having large trade deficits, while the 
four South American countries have been in surplus. A 
further group of countries have been relatively unaffected 
in that they are neither significant exporters to China nor 
competitors with China in the United States market.
The discussion of commodity prices in this paper 
provides a further element in the analysis of the differential 
impacts of Chinese demand on the region. It shows that 
those countries which are major exporters to China have 
also benefited from the high world commodity prices 
induced by the growth of Chinese demand. There are 
also some countries which have benefited from higher 
prices even though they are not significant exporters to 
China, most notably the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
and the three oil exporters (Ecuador, the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela and Mexico). The case of Mexico 
is particularly interesting since it is usually thought of 
as having been negatively affected by China.7 
On the other hand, the Central American countries 
as a group have been most negatively affected by the 
impact of China on commodity prices. With the exception 
of Costa Rica, these countries continue to recognize 
Taiwan Province of China and do not have significant 
exports to mainland China. They are also (along with the 
Dominican Republic and Mexico) the countries which 
have suffered most from Chinese competition in the 
United States market (Jenkins, 2008). The commodities 
which they export, such as coffee and bananas, have not 
benefited significantly from the growth of demand, while 
the cost of imported commodities, particularly oil, has 
risen. Thus, the “China effect” on commodity prices has 
reinforced the negative effects on their economies from 
Chinese competition in export markets.
7  Although Mexico has gained as a result of higher commodity prices, 
these have not necessarily compensated for the losses which it has 
suffered from Chinese competition in the United States market and 
possibly lower prices for its exports of manufactured goods.
VII
Conclusion
This paper is a first attempt to estimate one of the major 
indirect effects of the growth of China on the Latin 
American economies. While there have been a number 
of studies which have analysed the (negative) impact of 
Chinese competition on Latin American (particularly 
Mexican) exports of manufactures to third markets, and 
the role of China in the commodity boom is frequently 
mentioned, there have been no previous studies of the 
quantitative impact of Chinese demand on the value of 
the region’s exports of primary commodities.
While it is impossible to arrive at an exact estimate 
of the gains to Latin America from higher commodity 
prices attributable to China, the analysis presented here 
suggests that it is in the range of between US$ 42 billion 
and US$ 75 billion, most of which is accounted for by 
oil and minerals. To put this into context, the total value 
of Latin American exports to China and Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region in 2007 came to US$ 41 
billion and the increase in exports after 2002 was of 
US$ 34 billion. Since the increase in the value of Latin 
American exports to China was partly a result of the 
increase in commodity prices induced by the growth of 
Chinese demand, it is clear that even on a conservative 
estimate, the indirect impact on world prices was a more 
significant source of additional export earnings to the 
region than the direct impact of exports to China.
It follows that any analysis which fails to consider 
this indirect impact will underestimate the effect of 
China on the Latin American economies. China’s 
growth has undoubtedly boosted the export earnings 
of the region as a whole, both directly and indirectly. 
When individual countries in the region are considered, 
however, it becomes clear that, while the majority of 
countries have gained, there have also been losers from 
higher commodity prices. The main beneficiaries have 
been commodity exporters, particularly exporters of 
non-renewable resources, which raises questions about 
both the environmental sustainability of this pattern of 
growth and the implications for economic development 
of increasing specialization in primary commodities. The 
main losers in the region have been the Central American 
countries, and this negative impact has added to the negative 
effects which have resulted from the increased Chinese 
competition faced by their manufactured exports.
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APPENDIX
Sources consulted in arriving at elasticity estimates
Commodity Sources
Fuels
 Oil Kirchene (2005)
Minerals, ores and metals
 Iron ore Slade (1992); Behrman (1979)
 Copper Choe (1990); Behrman (1979)
 Aluminium Choe (1990); United States International Trade Commission (2006)
 Zinc Choe (1990)
Feedstuffs
 Soybean fapri (n.d.); Williams and Thompson (1984)
 Soybean oil Valdez and Zietz (1980)
Tropical food and beverages
 Coffee Akiyama and Varangis (1990); Behrman (1979)
 Sugar fapri (n.d.); Behrman (1979)
 Bananas Borrell and Hanslow (2004); Behrman (1979)
Meat products
 Beef Sarmiento and Allen (2003); Behrman (1979)
 Poultry fapri (n.d.)
Forest products
 Sawn wood Solingen and Sedjo (1996)
 Chemical pulp Bergman and Braunalund (1995)
(Original: English)
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